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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4014 
 ___________ 
 
 SHARON DAVIS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
CITY OF NEWARK; DIRECTOR GARRY MCCARTHY; DEPUTY CHIEF BRYAN 
MORRIS; CAPTAIN SHEILAH COLEY; CAPTAIN RONALD KINDER; CAPTAIN 
ANTHONY RUGGIERO; LIEUTENANT ANTHONY CARUSO; LIEUTENANT 
UMAR ABDUL-HAKEEM; INSTITUTE FOR FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, 
individually and under color of state law; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-99 (FICTITIOUS 
NAMES); XYZ CORPORATIONS 1-10, municipal or governmental entities and their 
supervisors, agents and employees 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:09-cv-01032) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
  (Opinion filed: June 28, 2011)     
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
  Sharon Davis, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing her amended civil rights complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will modify the District Court’s order and affirm that order as modified. 
I. 
  Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the background of 
this case, we discuss the events leading to this appeal only briefly.  Davis is a black 
female who served as a police officer with the Newark Police Department (“NPD”) in 
Newark, New Jersey, for several years prior to the termination of her employment in or 
around July 2007.  In March 2009, she commenced this action by filing a pro se 
complaint in the District Court.  She subsequently filed a pro se amended complaint in 
October 2009.  The amended complaint, brought against the City of Newark, several 
NPD officers, the Institute for Forensic Psychology, and numerous unidentified 
individuals and entities, alleged claims of retaliation under the First Amendment and 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well as claims of 
race and gender discrimination under Title VII.  The amended complaint also raised 
several state law claims. 
  In December 2009, the City of Newark and the NPD officers moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On September 10, 
2010, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed the entire amended complaint 
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with prejudice.  The court concluded that Davis’s First Amendment claims failed because 
the alleged triggers of the Defendants’ retaliation — a police report that Davis had 
prepared while an officer with the NPD, as well as various internal grievances she had 
submitted to her NPD superiors — were not protected speech under the First 
Amendment.  As for her Title VII claims, the District Court concluded that her amended 
complaint “is so devoid of factual substance that [she] cannot possibly state a claim under 
Title VII.”  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 8.)  Finally, because the court rejected all of Davis’s federal 
claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims.  Davis 
now seeks review of the District Court’s judgment. 
II.       
  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise de novo review over the District Court’s dismissal of Davis’s amended 
complaint, see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
may affirm that judgment on any basis supported by the record.  See Tourscher v. 
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  In conducting our review, “we accept as 
true all well-pled factual allegations in the [amended] complaint and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them, and we affirm the order of dismissal only if the 
pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.”  See Fellner v. Tri-Union 
Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008).    
  Having reviewed the record in this case, and for substantially the reasons 
provided by the District Court, we agree with the court’s decision to dismiss Davis’s Title 
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VII claims.  We also agree with the District Court that her retaliation claims fail under the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, for the police report and internal grievances 
that allegedly triggered the retaliatory activity were not made in her role as a private 
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 
418 (2006).  Although the District Court did not address whether her allegations of 
retaliation stated a claim under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, we conclude that 
they do not, for the Petition Clause, like the Free Speech Clause, is triggered only by 
matters of public concern.  See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 4564, 
at *6-7 (June 20, 2011); see also id. at *35 (stating that a public employee’s right under 
the Petition Clause “is not a right to transform everyday employment disputes into 
matters for constitutional litigation in the federal courts”).  Finally, to the extent Davis’ 
amended complaint alluded to alleged due process violations, we conclude that she failed 
to present a viable due process claim. 
  Because the District Court properly dismissed all of Davis’s constitutional 
and federal claims, it did not err in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
her state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a district court may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”); Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 
45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here the claim over which the district court has 
original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the 
pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness 
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to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.”).  We note, however, that 
these state law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice.  See Figueroa v. 
Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir. 1999).  Accordingly, we will modify 
the District Court’s September 10, 2010 order to reflect this point, and, in light of the 
above, affirm that order as modified. 
  
